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One of the key functions or purposes of international law (and law in general for that 
matter)1 is to provide long-term stability and legal certainty. Indeed, when adopting 
conventions, drafting treaties, making regulations generally the idea is not that those 
rules will elapse. Think, for instance, of human rights conventions the endurance of 
which is ensured by rather general formulations. Yet, international legal rules may also 
function as tools to deal with non-permanent or constantly changing issues, and rather 
than stable, international law may have to be flexible or adaptive. Hersch Lauterpacht 
discussed this question in terms of a struggle between change and stability and justice 
and security. And he pointed out that ‘[e]xperience teaches that in this struggle the 
element of change is not always victorious, for the simple reason that stability and 
security are in themselves a powerful constituent element of justice.’2 In his view, ‘[a]t 
present international law is more static than any other law not only because of the 
absence of an international legislature, but principally because it regulates relations 
which are not in themselves liable to be affected in a decisive manner by economic and 
other changes.’3 Whether this observation still holds true today is one of the main 
questions that is addressed in an upcoming volume of the Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law,4 focusing on temporariness across various fields of international law, 
such as the law of treaties, the law of international organisations, climate change, 
migration, international criminal law, international human rights law and so on. 
According to Lauterpacht, one of the reasons for the insistence by international law on 
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status quo is the absence of an international legislature which could deliberately change 
this situation. So far no such legislature has been created, which then raises the 
question how international law, if at all, could still react to or be influenced by changes, 
thus temporary issues. More concretely, what are the tools at the disposition of 
international law through which temporariness is dealt with? 
Prima facie, one could think of two main types of temporary aspects relevant from the 
perspective of international law. First, the nature of the object addressed by 
international law or the ‘problem’ that international law aims to address may be 
inherently temporary (temporary objects). While the object of regulation itself does not 
cease to exist, its features are bound to change throughout time. These changes are 
generally unknown or difficult to predict. In these cases regulations aim to address 
moving targets. Examples of this type of temporariness are abundant: climate change, 
migration, development, belligerent occupations and so on. Oftentimes this type of 
temporariness is studied through concepts that aim to deal with changes and 
uncertainty, such as risk management and regulation, precaution or resilience. 
Second, a subject of international law may be created for a specific period of time, after 
the lapse of which this entity ceases to exist (temporary subjects). These subjects 
mainly concern the establishment of institutions or other entities. Examples of such 
temporary institutions are also ample in international law: territorial administrations, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia and so on. 
The mainstream discussion with regard to this type of temporariness seems to focus on 
questions of justice, fairness and accountability. 
In addition to the above-mentioned approaches, these types of temporariness raise 
several questions from the perspective of international law, which are rarely addressed 
from a more conceptual perspective. Questions include the following: How does 
international law deal with matters that are non-permanent? What happens to 
international law when temporary creatures become permanent? What is the effect of 
temporary regulations on matters that are permanent? How does temporariness affect 
legal certainty? Put differently, where does international law stand on the continuum of 
predictability and pragmatism when it comes to temporary issues or institutions? 
 
2. Forms of Temporariness 
 
As indicated above, we feel that temporariness in international law may relate to both 
objects and subjects, and thought it might be of interest to devote an issue of the 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law to temporariness as it relates to both objects 
and subjects. Inspired by the contributions to the Yearbook, some examples are 
mentioned below to illustrate these forms of temporariness. 
 
2.1 Temporary Objects 
 
An outstanding example of temporary objects is climate change. This object is 
temporary in the sense that, as the name already indicates, the climate is undergoing 
certain changes; i.e. its nature varies or might vary from time to time, which is 
influenced, among others, by technological advances, socio-economic conditions and 
demographic developments. In addition, due to developments and shifts in scientific 
Page 3 of 6 
insights the manner in which climate change is seen is also prone to changes. Put 
differently, from time to time this problem needs to be tackled differently – i.e. a solution 
at a given moment in time might not work at another moment. Accordingly, a particular 
mechanism addressing the problem is almost by definition temporary. 
Another widely known example of a temporary object in international law is the situation 
of refuge-seekers. While refugees are generally seen as subjects of international law, 
the problem surrounding them can rather be described as the object of regulation. The 
nature of refugee protection is inherently temporary, though in a somewhat different 
manner than that of climate change: the general purpose of this regime is to re-establish 
the relationship between the original state of nationality and provide a temporary 
solution until then – thus regarding the regime as an ‘exception’. I.e. the problem itself is 
generally seen as temporary, while in the case of climate change the problem has 
become temporary due to the changes involved. Nevertheless, the refugee protection 
regime is also subject to changes – making it temporary in a different manner. Namely, 
the refugees change, the number of refugees to be ‘tackled’ at a certain point in time is 
also subject to change, and obviously the domestic situation in the receiving state as 
well as in the state of origin also varies in many respects – which might also have 
impact on the way in which temporary protection can and will be provided to those who 
are escaping from their state of origin. 
National crises or emergencies are also temporary ‘problems’ that in general justify the 
somewhat reduced protection of human rights, i.e. the adoption of human right 
derogations. Put differently, the temporary problem here is the lower level of protection 
of human rights, which depends on the particular circumstances of the emergency 
situation. Similarly to refugee protection, the problem here is inherently and strictly 
temporary. As soon as the crisis or emergency ends, derogations should be eliminated 
too. 
As opposed to human rights derogations, affirmative action measures rather provide a 
higher level of protection. When affirmative actions or positive action measures are 
needed, the problem that needs to be addressed is inequality that stems from past 
discriminatory treatment. In other words, affirmative action measures aim to heal the 
consequences of a differential treatment adopted in the past, which has resulted in an 
unequal situation in the present. Nevertheless, they are similar to human rights 
derogations in that they will need to cease to exist after a period of time, namely when 
equal opportunities have been created. 
Questions like these relate to an overarching objective of international law: a stable rule 
of law. If one perceives the international rule of law as the framework to provide stability 
and fairness (following domestic democratic notions based on that idea), the question is 
to what extent it can be combined with temporary issues. An answer to this can be that 
temporary institutions and rules can actually promote the international rule of law, 
providing more flexible solutions for the long-term achievement of a stable rule of law. In 
a way, this reveals that, international law itself (or at least parts of it) could also be 
regarded as object of temporariness. In fact, one could argue that some temporariness 
is inherent in the main sources of international law. Custom is inherently fluid and allows 
international law to change according to adapted practices and legal opinions. While the 
objective of written law is to overcome uncertainties and provide ‘fixed’ interpretations, 
treaties are often seen as ‘living instruments’, the interpretation of which may follow new 
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insights and developments. In fact, treaty law itself allows for amendment and 
modification. In the law of treaties ‘subsequent practice’, ‘subsequent agreements’, 
‘relevant rules’ and ‘supplementary means’ play an essential role and discussions often 
relate to the tension between the intentions of the drafters and the ways these play out 
later. 
Similarly, international law, as object of temporariness, may be challenged to remedy 
flaws in its system. When structural solutions are out of sight due to, for instance, 
political controversies, temporary solutions may be in order, and acceptable to the 
international community. The articles assembled in the new Netherlands Yearbook offer 
ample examples of such temporary ‘repairs’, including the establishment of ad hoc 
tribunals. An example that has received quite some attention of the past years concerns 
the immunity of international organisations. As an almost inherent element of the 
international system, structural changes are not to be foreseen in the immediate future. 
Yet, international organisations change and are increasingly active in rule-making that 
has effects on individuals. There may, however, be accountability gaps in this regard, in 
particular in relation to private claims. The question then is whether negative 
consequences of systemic choices can be remedied by allowing for temporary 
solutions. 
 
2.2 Temporary Subjects 
 
An outstanding example of temporary subjects is the so called commission of inquiry 
(CoI). These subjects are established as a reaction to an incident in an ad hoc manner. 
It seems that, in addition to the political difficulties involved in negotiating the 
establishment of a permanent (quasi-)judicial body, the nature of the incidents justifies 
the creation of such ad hoc mechanisms. These commissions are established for 
investigating (mainly) the facts of a specific international incident involving two or more 
states.  
Temporariness of subjects of international law can also take a different form. Although 
there is a permanent court for punishing those responsible for the most serious crimes, 
international criminal justice still seems to favour temporary solutions. More specifically, 
the present criminal tribunals have been set up in an ad hoc manner, resulting in not-
well-thought-through procedural rules and thus representing a mix of the two main 
systems, namely the adversarial and the judge-led models. This approach leaves quite 
some room for judicial trial and error – reflecting another temporary dimension of these 
institutions. In this case, temporariness relates to the functioning of specific institutions, 
or put differently, temporariness is visible in the main legal features of the operation of 
these institutions. The institutions themselves might be established on a permanent 
basis, but the manner in which they carry out their work is characterised by temporary 
elements. 
At a more theoretical level, the impact of temporary institutions, or more broadly, 
temporary regimes on international law may serve as examples. These examples can 
be seen as addressing temporary objects (e.g. refugee law as well as climate change), 
while international criminal law, for instance, can be related to temporary subjects. 
These two aspects of temporariness can clearly be compared as to their general effect 
on permanent regimes. 
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Last but not least, the question of temporariness can be approached in a somewhat 
different manner. Rather than looking at the temporary subjects as defined above, one 
may look at the so-called ‘permanent subjects’. Even though many of the subjects of 
international law are established as permanent ‘institutions’, this permanency does not 
mean that they are static, i.e. that they do not change. Put differently, even permanent 
institutions can be seen as temporary ones, given their dynamic existence that is 
steered by interaction among the various actors/subjects of international law. Such a 
dynamic is, however, difficult to be discovered given the constant present used in 




3. Conclusion: All Relative? 
 
A popular view on temporariness in international law may be that it potentially harms the 
already quite shaky international legal order. Indeed, as we noted, one of the key 
functions or purposes of international law is to provide long-term stability and legal 
certainty. In analysing the different views on temporariness, we may conclude that this 
element is certainly present, but that the opposite is also visible. More specifically, the 
examples illustrate that temporariness (or permanency) is relational. Nevertheless, this 
temporal element of either the objects or the subjects of international law has impact on 
international law. While it seems that concerning temporary objects there is an 
underlying aim to ensure both predictability and at the same time being pragmatic, as 
far as temporary subjects are concerned a pragmatic approach might turn out to have a 
negative impact on predictability. This difference might be explained by the difference 
between objects and subjects as such. Subjects of international law have ‘independent’ 
living and functioning, and they oftentimes want to set up their own approaches, 
mechanisms etc. Objects of international law, however, are subject to regulation, which 
most likely will ensure predictability when addressing a problem. All in all and depending 
on whether positive or negative meanings are associated with temporariness, a 
particular expectation is created, thus having an impact on the response provided, too. 
With regard to temporary objects where the issue or object is changing (and is thus 
temporary), this change is simply seen as a given that needs to be addressed in one 
way or another; i.e. the association with temporariness is definitely not negative. The 
general response to this change is the need to have ‘flexibility’ mechanisms built into 
the system. The system then can be criticised if it lacks or does not sufficiently embed 
such mechanisms. In addition, temporariness is also seen in this context as a 
phenomenon that can provide meaning, thus influencing the interpretation of otherwise 
permanent concepts. 
Unlike temporary objects, the temporary subjects of international law are associated 
with both positive and negative features. As far as the positive features are concerned, 
it has been highlighted that temporary institutions can be seen as correcting, at least to 
a certain extent, the deficits of so-called permanent institutions. Moreover, 
temporariness is also contrasted with being static - temporariness is essentially seen as 
a form of flexibility or dynamism. However, we should remain aware of the dangers of 
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‘ad hocism’ as a form of temporariness as opposed to well-thought-through regimes. In 
this latter case, temporariness thus obtains a negative association. 
It is the search for this balance between pragmatism and predictability that can be 
discovered with regard to temporary objects and subjects of international law. At the 
same time these two notions should not always be contrasted. Under certain 
circumstances, pragmatism may contribute to predictability as the latter is not only 
based on static international law, but may require dynamism and change to remain 
relevant. The upcoming Yearbook underlines that change is not something that we 
should see as an exception; in many cases it is a structural or systemic part of the 
international legal system.  
 
 
